than they would be in a closed economy, according to canonical models of international trade. Governments could tax citizens who gain from trade and use these revenues to compensate citizens for trade-induced losses. Survey research demonstrates that such compensation schemes can reduce individuals' opposition to free trade. Yet an important question remains unanswered: When and under what conditions do legislators actually provide trade-related compensation? This question motivates the current study.
Legislative activity in the United States, one of the world's largest trading nations, is examined during a period of rapid economic integration . Roll call votes are used to identify legislators who support both trade liberalization and spending on programs that assist citizens who become unemployed as a result of trade. Analyses of roll call votes show that protrade legislators are more likely to support spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance programs when a larger proportion of their constituents are exporters. Exporters and their elected representative arguably support such expenditures in an attempt to reduce opposition to free trade and broaden the protrade coalition.
This finding points to the importance of a policy bundle, described by Senator Coleman (R-MN) as "the expansion of trade while meeting the needs of those workers who are negatively impacted" (U.S. Congress May 3, 2004, S4756) . This policy bundle, frequently referred to as either embedded liberalism or the compensation hypothesis, was initially described by Ruggie (1982) . He argued that the move toward free trade following World War II was facilitated by a change in government policy that provided compensation, via increased government spending, to those harmed by trade. Ruggie's insight launched a new research agenda-one that subsequently inspired a vast number of studies of the empirical relationship between international trade and governmental spending. 1 The current study differs from the myriad previous studies in three ways. First, early studies examine the effects of trade on aggregate government expenditures. Studies that find a positive correlation between trade and total spending interpret this as evidence that governments invest more resources in compensating citizens for trade-induced losses following an increase in trade. Yet most government spending has little, if anything, to do with trade-related compensation. Even social welfare spending, for example, assists many vulnerable citizens, not just those for whom trade has a negative impact (Burgoon 2001) . Thus, the inferences drawn about governments' trade-induced motives are difficult to substantiate using general spending measures.
2 In contrast, the current study focuses on a spending program specifically designed to compensate citizens for trade-induced losses, namely Trade Adjustment Assistance. The United States' Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program was established in the Trade Act of 1974. TAA programs provide assistance to workers who lose their jobs or experience a reduction in their working hours or wages due to increased imports. Workers may be eligible for cash benefits, job training, health-care tax credits, job search assistance, relocation allowances, income support, and other reemployment services through TAA programs. Wage insurance is also provided under certain circumstances.
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Trade Adjustment Assistance provides precisely the type of assistance envisaged by embedded liberalism; it targets help directly to those citizens made worse off by trade. The current study thus offers an improvement over earlier studies by examining spending on TAA programs rather than aggregate government spending or general budget items.
Second, many previous studies assume that trade liberalization is exogenously determined and take, as given, countries' exposure to foreign trade. 4 However, governments purposefully act to set tariff rates, decide to join international trade agreements (or not), impose regulations, and enact other policies that serve as nontariff barriers to trade. In some countries, these policy decisions are made by the legislature. In the United States, for example, legislators vote on bills that increase or decrease the exposure of the national economy to competition from foreign goods and services. Using roll call votes, the current study examines when and under what conditions legislators who vote to liberalize trade policy also support trade-related compensation. In this way, the current study takes a step toward "endogenizing" trade policy.
Third, more recent studies of trade and spending tend to analyze individual-level survey data (for example, Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Margalit 2012 ).
5 While instructive, individual-level studies can only provide indirect evidence of the propensity of governments and parliaments to compensate citizens for the costs of trade. Furthermore, individual citizens need not realize the importance of TAA programs for maintaining support for free trade in order for the embedded liberalism thesis to hold (Ehrlich 2010) . Legislators may bundle together liberalization and compensation as a rational means. An insightful reviewer pointed out this possibility, which suggests a potentially fruitful strategy for future research. 3 Although the primary focus of TAA programs is displaced workers, the program also includes some provisions for aiding firms and communities harmed by trade (Baicker and Rehavi 2004) . For example, the Department of Commerce established 12 regional TAA Centers in 1978 to help firms with the TAA petitions and to help them develop business plans for dealing with increased international competition. Firms whose business plans were approved were eligible for matching funds of up to $75,000. 4 See Adsera and Boix (2002) for an excellent discussion of this point. 5 Margalit (2011) investigates individual-level voting behavior. response to the competing demands they face. In fact, the embedded liberalism thesis was originally conceived of as a supply side story. Governments were thought to have recognized the importance of combining liberalization with compensation following the collapse of the gold standard and the interwar global economy (Ruggie 1982) . The current study provides one of the first direct tests of the supply side of the embedded liberalism thesis by investigating protrade legislators' votes on TAA funding.
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EXPLAINING TAA VOTES At times, legislators have the opportunity to decide whether or not to increase spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance programs. A vast majority (70%) of legislators who vote against trade liberalization also vote to increase spending on TAA programs. These legislators seek to protect their constituents by voting against liberalization. As a second line of defense, they also vote to fund TAA programs that will help workers who become unemployed due to trade. This pattern is not surprising. However, the pattern of support for TAA funding among protrade legislators is puzzling.
Legislators who vote to liberalize trade barriers are evenly split over TAA funding increases; 50% of "protrade" legislators vote to increase TAA funding while 50% vote against TAA funding increases. Which protrade legislators support increased TAA funding and why? This question is the central motivation for the current study. The "compensation hypothesis," which derives from the logic of embedded liberalism, posits that governments increase spending to offset the costs of trade liberalization. Governments are believed to increase expenditures to avert a backlash against freer trade. This logic implies that legislators representing more trade winners will be more likely to vote for TAA spending. Arguably, such legislators support TAA funding in an attempt to minimize opposition to free trade, not only in their own districts, but also more broadly. Legislators who place the highest value on broadening the protrade coalition are most likely to vote for TAA funding increases. For example, Senator Baucus (D-MT), when speaking in favor of increased TAA funding, said trade-related compensation "can make an important difference in public attitudes. Surveys show that most American feel a lot more comfortable with globalization, off-shoring and trade when they know they will get help if their jobs are threatened" (U.S. Congress April 29, 2004:4680) . Similarly, Senator Grassley (R-IA) acknowledged public support for free trade as a key reason to vote for TAA funding. Speaking in favor of extending traderelated compensation to farmers in the 2002 Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act, Grassley said, "I am very concerned that if we lose (farm) support for free trade it will be very hard for us to win Congressional support for new trade deals when they are concluded" (U.S. Congress May 3, 2004:4757) . In short, protrade legislators support trade-related compensation programs, such as TAA, in order to broaden the protrade coalition and minimize opposition to current and future liberalization.
TAA programs can help make trade liberalization politically viable. The promise of increased spending on trade-related compensation secured the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Baicker and Rehavi 2004) .
8 Increased spending on trade-related compensation also helped to secure the votes needed to renew fast-track authority for the Bush administration in 2002 (Baicker and Rehavi 2004) . 9 Senator Nickles (R-OK) stated that the amendment promising increased spending on traderelated compensation programs was "added to the fast-track promotion bill to encourage people to vote for it" (U.S. Congress May 4, 2004:4817) .
This anecdotal evidence suggests that the legislators who place the greatest value on broadening the protrade coalition are precisely those legislators most likely to vote for TAA funding increases. Legislators' roll call votes are analyzed in the following section to investigate this possibility.
SAMPLE AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The universe of clean Senate votes on TAA funding is identified for the period from 1980 to 2004. Five clean, competitive roll call votes on funding for Trade Adjustment Assistance occurred during this period.
10 These votes are "clean" in the sense that a vote for or against captures a legislator's position on increasing funding for TAA programs (Broz 2008; Broz and Hawes 2006) . To ensure that a vote reflects only a legislator's inclination 8 Congress agreed to fund a program called NAFTA Transition Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA TAA) in an attempt to secure the number of votes needed to pass NAFTA. This aim of NAFTA TAA was to provide financial assistance to workers displaced by trade with Canada and/or Mexico. It also promised assistance to workers displaced by plant relocations to Mexico (Baicker and Rehavi, 2004) . 9 Fast-track negotiating authority allows the President of the United States to negotiate trade agreements that Congress can then only approve or disapprove (that is, they cannot amend or filibuster). 10 Competitive votes are defined as votes for which at least 10% of the votes are in opposition to the majority.
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toward trade-related compensation spending, votes containing issues other than TAA funding are excluded.
11 Table 1 details each of the five TAA votes. Clean, competitive votes on trade policy that occur in the same or consecutive Congress as the TAA votes are identified. This strategy ensures that the same legislators, representing the same constituents, vote on both trade policy and TAA spending. Following Milner and Tingley (2011) , procedural votes and "sense of Congress" votes are excluded, and thus only those votes that had clear consequences for US trade policy are examined. Noncompetitive votes are also excluded from the sample. Using these criteria, four clean trade policy votes occurring in the same or consecutive Congress as the TAA votes are identified. Table 2 provides detailed information regarding the trade policy votes. Table 3 reports the four vote pairs analyzed in the current study. Votes on trade policy are used to identify the sample of pro-free-trade senators. Votes on TAA funding are then used to identify which protrade senators vote to increase TAA spending.
12 Vote pairs are pooled together to provide a reasonable sample size.
MEASURING CONSTITUENTS' ECONOMIC INTERESTS
Two well-established theories are used to identify citizens' economic interests. The first, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941) , demonstrates that trade increases real returns for owners of the factor of production with which the country's economy is relatively abundantly endowed. 13 In contrast, trade reduces real returns for owners of the scarce factor of production. In the United States, high-skilled labor is relatively abundant during the period under investigation, and thus high-skilled workers are expected to win from trade.
Census data on citizens' occupations are used to estimate the number of high-skilled workers in a state. Some occupations are characterized by high skill, including, for example, executive, managerial, administrative, and Katz and Murphy 1992) . Since the variables Skill and Education are alternative measures of the same concept (that is, factor-based economic interests), they do not enter the estimated models simultaneously.
The Ricardo-Viner model demonstrates that the income effects of trade are industry specific when factors are immobile between industries within an economy (Hiscox 2002; Jones 1971) .
14 Factors employed in export industries receive a real increase in returns due to trade and therefore support trade liberalization. In contrast, factors employed in import-competing industries lose from trade in real terms.
The relative number of industry-based trade winners in a given US state is calculated by the percentage of a state's population employed in net export industries (Exporters). Net export industries are defined as two-digit SIC manufacturing sectors where the ratio of revenues from exports to total industry revenue is greater than the ratio of imports to consumption. 15 A similar calculation identifies the percentage of a state's population employed in net import industries (Import-competitors). According to the Ricardo-Viner model, the variable Import-competitors captures the number of citizens incurring losses from trade in a given state. Exporters and Import-competitors measure different concepts of interest and can therefore be entered simultaneously into the estimated models, as is increasingly standard practice (see, for example, Fordham and McKeown 2003) .
14 A large literature focuses on which of these models best predicts the distributive effects of trade. See Hiscox (2002) for an outline of this debate. 15 These ratios are provided by Campa and Goldberg (1999) for three time periods: 1975 , 1985 , and 1995 . Following Broz (2008 , the sample closest to each vote is used to assemble the data. Previous studies of trade legislation demonstrated that despite the relatively low level of party discipline in the United States, a legislator's party affiliation is a robust predictor of their votes on trade policy (Hiscox 2002; Ladewig 2006) . All estimated models therefore include the variable Party, which is coded 1 for Democrats and 0 for Republicans. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for logit regression models where the dependent variable equals 1 if a protrade senator voted to increase funding for TAA programs and 0 if they voted against TAA spending increases. Protrade senators are more likely to vote for increased TAA funding when they represent relatively more exporters. On average, an increase in the variable Exporters of one standard deviation over its mean value corresponds with a five percentage point increase in the probability that a protrade senator votes for increased TAA funding. In short, more exporters equal greater support for TAA funding. Yet, exporters do not directly benefit from TAA programs. They are unlikely to become unemployed because of trade and therefore do not qualify for assistance under the TAA criteria. Instead, exporters benefit indirectly from TAA spending. Exporters and their elected representative arguably support TAA spending to reduce opposition to free trade.
RESULTS
The industry-based measure of trade winners (that is, exporters) is a better predictor of TAA votes than factor-based measures of trade winners. The estimated coefficients for Skill and Education are consistently insignificant. Senators representing relatively more factor-based winners (that is, more highly educated/highly skilled voters) are no more likely to vote Destler 1995; Fordham and McKeown 2003; Hiscox 2002; Lowi 1964) . The evidence reported here comes down squarely on the side of the Ricardo-Viner model. Industry-based interests are a better predictor of TAA votes than factor-based interests. Industrybased models of trade may perform better in recent decades due to increased adjustment costs and factor specificity, as hypothesized by Hiscox (2002) . The null findings for the variables Skill and Education are also consistent with research that finds that highly educated citizens support trade liberalization for reasons other than economic self-interest. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) argue that college-educated voters support trade openness because of their exposure to economic ideas about the overall efficiency gains from trade. Although economic literacy may lead to increased support for trade, it may not generate similar support for trade-related compensation. Voters who support trade openness for ideational reasons may be unwilling to support TAA spending. If citizens' support for trade openness is not motivated by economic self-interest, they have few incentives to pay for trade-related compensation. In other words, voters who support trade openness for ideational reasons may not be willing to "back up" their ideals financially, which may explain why protrade senators from states with relatively more college-educated voters are no more likely to vote for increased TAA spending. 16 In contrast, protrade senators from states with relatively more industry-specific trade winners (that is, exporters) are significantly more likely to vote for TAA funding increases.
Protrade senators who represent relatively more industry-based trade losers (that is, import-competing industries) are less likely to vote for TAA funding increases. Why would senators vote against trade-related compensation when some of their constituents could benefit from TAA programs?
17
One possible explanation is that large numbers of exporters are needed to generate sufficient demand for free trade in order to motivate senators to fund TAA programs. In other words, senators who place the highest value on broadening the protrade coalition are the ones most likely to vote for TAA funding.
18 Senators attach more value to strengthening the protrade coalition when their states are dominated by exporting industries. Senators representing fewer exporters have relatively less interest in the protrade coalition and thus may be less willing to support TAA funding. Party is a robust predictor of TAA votes. Democrats are more likely to vote for TAA funding, as compared to Republicans, holding all else equal. This result is consistent with other studies of roll call voting on both distributive spending programs and trade policy (for example, Garrett 1998; Hiscox 2002; Ladewig 2006) . Interestingly, however, the results reported here suggest that even Republicans, who often oppose spending increases, are willing to support increased TAA funding when a substantial portion of their constituents stand to gain from trade. As Senator Wilson, a Republican from California, made clear on the floor of the chamber:
[T]he high cost of protectionism is inevitably the result of efforts to protect jobs in selected industries. It is an effort I well understand and with which I have sympathy. That is why . . . I supported the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act in its provisions to assist those who suffer hardship because the industry of which they are a member and in which they are employed ceases to be competitive. (U.S. Congress July 16, 1990:S9770).
Similarly, Senator Chafee, a Republican from Rhode Island, said:
I understand that the footwear industry has suffered employment losses, and any significant employment loss to a U.S. industry is a cause of concern to every one of us. That is why we have done something about it. We recognized that in the highly competitive world there are some areas that we are going to be able to compete in successfully and some areas less successfully. So we have set up these safety nets, if you would, the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program . . . to help individuals who have lost their jobs because of foreign competition" (U.S. Congress July 16, 1990:9799) .
In sum, even Republicans are willing to vote for increased spending when it is designed to compensate citizens for their trade-induced losses and a large number of their constituents stand to gain from freer trade.
CONCLUSION
The current study presents evidence that governments purposefully increase expenditures to offset the costs of international trade. While governments in countries with open economies are widely believed to spend more, few studies actually examine governments' purposeful spending decisions.
In contrast, the current study examines paired roll call votes on trade policy and spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) in the United States during the period from 1980 to 2004. The results show that protrade legislators are more likely to support increased TAA funding when a larger proportion of their constituents stand to gain from trade. Specifically, protrade legislators representing relatively more exporters are more likely to vote for increased TAA spending, even though exporters themselves do not benefit directly from TAA programs. Instead, exporters and their elected representatives arguably support such spending to minimize domestic opposition to free trade.
This finding suggests that the concurrent trends in trade openness and governmental spending may be causally related. The global rush to free trade has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in government spending, especially in developed countries (Kono 2011; Rickard 2012; Rodrik 1998) . Previous studies argue that these two concurrent trends are causally related.
19 However, the current study is the first to examine legislators' contemporaneous decisions on trade openness and government spending. Protrade legislators vote to increase spending on TAA programs when they represent a large number of industry-specific trade winners. This finding suggests that a causal relationship may, in fact, exist between trade and government spending. Additional studies of the supply side of trade-induced spending increases are needed. Yet this study takes an important first step in moving beyond simple correlations between trade flows and spending levels by focusing instead on legislators' decisions regarding trade policy and trade-related compensation spending.
